Pentagon Recidivism Report

In their NYT op-ed published on May 28, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann argue that the number of recidivists (74) among the 534 men released from Guantanamo identified in a recent Pentagon report, is “very likely inflated” because “the Pentagon includes on the list any released prisoner who is either ‘confirmed’ or just ‘suspected’ to have engaged in terrorism anywhere in the world, whether those actions were directed at the United States or not.” They state that 14 of the 29 men whose names show up on the Pentagon list “are listed as being ‘suspected’ of terrorist activities, which makes ‘recidivist’ a fairly vague definition.” They also note that (1) 9 of the 29 have engaged in activities that were not directed at America or its “immediate” allies, (2) 11 Saudis have “only” fomented resistance against the monarchy, and (3) the Defense Department “bizarrely” lumps in those who have “done no more than” criticize the U.S. after their release.

Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann are free to argue that the Pentagon should only include “confirmed” cases, but that does not mean the Pentagon has inflated its numbers. The Pentagon has simply counted the number of recidivists based on criterion it has developed. It would appear that Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann are being disingenuous in their attempt to make the more reasonable argument that the Pentagon has “inflated” the threat. But even that is unlikely. The public discussion often focuses on whether former detainees now released have participated in a direct attack such as 9-11. But just as important as an actual terrorist attack is the infrastructure that enables, supports, cultivates, and plans terrorist attacks.

For example, “mere” criticism of the U.S. may not be innocuous if, say, criticism is part of a propaganda campaign waged on As-Sahab (al Qaeda’s media production agency) or another outlet, and used for recruitment. The ongoing threat of terrorism depends significantly on the infrastructure that enables it, and this includes recruitment of fledgling jihadists susceptible to anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric from sheiks, fatwas, and al Qaeda facilitators. It may be that the criticism of America to which Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann refer was merely conversational, but it may also be that “recidivists” have joined the propaganda campaign against America, thereby contributing to the recruitment and radicalization of budding jihadists. If so, the criticism offered by Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann is rather bizarre.

Moreover, Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann imply that we should not be concerned because, for example, Ravil Gumarov and Timur Ishmurat, two of the men released and since designated as recidivists, were convicted in 2006 of blowing up a gas pipeline in Russia and not in the U.S. But a terrorist is a terrorist, and there are more than a few examples of terrorists who started out fighting in other arenas but went on to attack America. Case in point: Mohammed Atta and some of his accomplices, for example, were initially attracted to jihad in Chechnya until they were subsequently recruited to carry out the 9-11 attacks.