In their NYT op-ed published on May 28, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann argue that the number of recidivists (74) among the 534 men released from Guantanamo identified in a recent Pentagon report, is “very likely inflated” because “the Pentagon includes on the list any released prisoner who is either ‘confirmed’ or just ‘suspected’ to have engaged in terrorism anywhere in the world, whether those actions were directed at the United States or not.” They state that 14 of the 29 men whose names show up on the Pentagon list “are listed as being ‘suspected’ of terrorist activities, which makes ‘recidivist’ a fairly vague definition.” They also note that (1) 9 of the 29 have engaged in activities that were not directed at America or its “immediate” allies, (2) 11 Saudis have “only” fomented resistance against the monarchy, and (3) the Defense Department “bizarrely” lumps in those who have “done no more than” criticize the U.S. after their release.
Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann are free to argue that the Pentagon should only include “confirmed” cases, but that does not mean the Pentagon has inflated its numbers. The Pentagon has simply counted the number of recidivists based on criterion it has developed. It would appear that Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann are being disingenuous in their attempt to make the more reasonable argument that the Pentagon has “inflated” the threat. But even that is unlikely. The public discussion often focuses on whether former detainees now released have participated in a direct attack such as 9-11. But just as important as an actual terrorist attack is the infrastructure that enables, supports, cultivates, and plans terrorist attacks.
For example, “mere” criticism of the U.S. may not be innocuous if, say, criticism is part of a propaganda campaign waged on As-Sahab (al Qaeda’s media production agency) or another outlet, and used for recruitment. The ongoing threat of terrorism depends significantly on the infrastructure that enables it, and this includes recruitment of fledgling jihadists susceptible to anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric from sheiks, fatwas, and al Qaeda facilitators. It may be that the criticism of America to which Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann refer was merely conversational, but it may also be that “recidivists” have joined the propaganda campaign against America, thereby contributing to the recruitment and radicalization of budding jihadists. If so, the criticism offered by Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann is rather bizarre.
Moreover, Mr. Bergen and Ms. Tiedemann imply that we should not be concerned because, for example, Ravil Gumarov and Timur Ishmurat, two of the men released and since designated as recidivists, were convicted in 2006 of blowing up a gas pipeline in Russia and not in the U.S. But a terrorist is a terrorist, and there are more than a few examples of terrorists who started out fighting in other arenas but went on to attack America. Case in point: Mohammed Atta and some of his accomplices, for example, were initially attracted to jihad in Chechnya until they were subsequently recruited to carry out the 9-11 attacks.
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Terrorist Recruitment
On January 28, 2009, former national security officials and counterterrorism experts submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in support of Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, the lone “enemy combatant” held in the U.S. They contend that military action alone is insufficient to defeat terrorism, and that countering terrorist recruitment efforts by winning “hearts and minds” is an integral part of the battle, a contention with which this author does not disagree. They also argue that “[i]mprisonment without trial of individuals seized inside the United States promotes the false narrative of a United States engaged in war on Islam and Muslims, which the terrorists exploit for recruitment.”[1] As a result, “using the paradigm of the ‘war on terror’ and the label ‘enemy combatant’ to justify the indefinite military detention of individuals seized inside the United States does not preserve our national security; it threatens it.”[2]
As an empirical matter, this contention is a testable hypothesis according to which national security is undermined by a system of indefinite detention by more than it otherwise would be under an alternative system of justice, namely, trial in a U.S. court. But the authors do not rigorously apply this test. They simply reiterate the commonly heard argument that indefinite detention in Guantanamo has undermined our national security because it serves as a recruiting tool. They write: “By treating a terrorism suspect apprehended within the United States as an ‘enemy combatant,’ rather than as a criminal suspect, we grant the suspect the very status a terrorist seeks, a status widely honored by those to whom terrorists propound their narrative.”[3]
They contrast this scenario with trial and conviction in U.S. courts, after which, they argue, terrorists are forgotten and lose their ability to inspire jihad. The authors mention the cases of terrorists tried and convicted, namely, Ramzi Yousef and Fawaz Yunis, stating:
…treating the terrorism suspect seized in the United States as a criminal suspect pursuant to statutes that proscribe engagement in terrorist activity focuses the narrative on the alleged terrorist activity, rather than his status as a ‘warrior,’ thereby deconstructing the terrorist narrative. The heroism of armed conflict against the enemy becomes the cowardice of anonymous violence against innocent victims. The aspiring member of a great army, when isolated to his crime, becomes a small-minded individual.
About a warrior held in a military prison an extravagant mythology may be erected; but the fellow in the dock of a public trial, forced to witness the deliberate presentation of evidence of his cowardice becomes pathetic. His narrative loses the power to inspire. Like Ramzi Yousef, Fawaz Yunis, and many others convicted of terrorist acts in U.S. courts, he may soon be forgotten.[4]
Surprisingly, the authors ignore the case of Sheik Omar Abdul al-Rahman. Sheikh al-Rahman had a leading role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and was eventually indicted and convicted for seditious acts against the U.S. He is currently serving a life sentence in a maximum security penitentiary in the U.S., but has not been forgotten by our enemies and is frequently cited in recruitment efforts by al Qaeda.
For example, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri concluded an interview conducted four years after 9-11 by making no distinction between terrorists convicted in U.S. courts and detainees held in Guantanamo and elsewhere: “In closing, I take this opportunity to address our captives, who are being held in Crusader jails, and especially our mujahid Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman, as well as our captives in America, in Guantanamo, in Abu Ghraib, in Baghram, in the secret American jails around the world, and in the prisons of the tyrants of Egypt, the Peninsula, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and in Palestine and elsewhere – I say to them: We have not forgotten you. We are still committed to the debt of your salvation. And with Allah’s strength, we will continue to deliver blows to America and its allies, until we shatter your shackles.”[5]
Moreover, Osama Bin Laden made no such distinction in a speech on “tactical recommendations” in which he made clear he has not forgotten Sheikh Omar Abdul al-Rahman: “We ask God to free us from the Americans and their allies, and to free Sheikhs Omar Abdel Rahman and Said Ibn Zuwayr, as well as our brothers in Guantanamo.”[6] In a Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, Bin Laden said: “…the Judeo-Christian coalition assassinated or jailed the most sincere ulema and the most active preachers…; they killed Abdallah Azzam, the sheikh and mujahid, and jailed Ahmad Yassin, the sheikh and mujahid, on the path of the Prophet’s ‘nocturnal voyage’. They jailed Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman in America….”[7]
In May 1998, two years after Sheikh al-Rahman was convicted and sentenced to life in a U.S. prison, the sheikh’s two sons were present at a press conference where, as recounted by Rohan Gunaratna in Inside Al Qaeda, “Osama [Bin Laden] called once again for jihad against US troops and announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders.”[8] Gunarantna notes that al-Zawahiri and Muhammed Atef, the one-time head of military operations for Al Qaeda until he was killed in November 2001, were also present at the press conference.[9] During the conference, the sheikh’s two sons distributed a card with a picture of the blind sheikh praying and a message calling for Muslims to attack Jews and Christians: “Divide their nation, tear them to shreds, destroy their economy, burn their companies, ruin their welfare, sink their ships and kill them on land, sea and air.”[10]
It is clear that al Qaeda has not forgotten the case of Sheikh al-Rahman. Moreover, it appears that the blind sheikh has not lost his ability to inflame the passions of potential jihadists. This is not to say that trial in U.S. courts is a bad idea. But to imply that it is more effective in countering terrorist recruitment efforts than indefinite detention in Guantanamo is to ignore a blatant example suggesting that al Qaeda makes no distinction between Guantanamo detainees and terrorists convicted in U.S. courts.
[1] Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, Petitioner, v. Daniel Spagone, U.S.N. Commander, Consolidated Naval Brig, Respondent, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Brief Amici Curiae of Former National Security Officials and Counterterorism Experts in Support of Petitioner (“Amicus brief”), p. 11.
[2] Amicus brief, p. 22
[3] Amicus brief, p. 18
[4] Amicus brief, pp. 20-21
[5] Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader, Broadway Books, 2007, pp. 188-89.
[6] Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 65.
[7] Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 48.
[8] Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, Berkeley Publishing Group, 2002, 2003, p. 63.
[9] Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, Berkeley Publishing Group, 2002, 2003, p. 63.
[10] Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, Berkeley Publishing Group, 2002, 2003, p. 63.
As an empirical matter, this contention is a testable hypothesis according to which national security is undermined by a system of indefinite detention by more than it otherwise would be under an alternative system of justice, namely, trial in a U.S. court. But the authors do not rigorously apply this test. They simply reiterate the commonly heard argument that indefinite detention in Guantanamo has undermined our national security because it serves as a recruiting tool. They write: “By treating a terrorism suspect apprehended within the United States as an ‘enemy combatant,’ rather than as a criminal suspect, we grant the suspect the very status a terrorist seeks, a status widely honored by those to whom terrorists propound their narrative.”[3]
They contrast this scenario with trial and conviction in U.S. courts, after which, they argue, terrorists are forgotten and lose their ability to inspire jihad. The authors mention the cases of terrorists tried and convicted, namely, Ramzi Yousef and Fawaz Yunis, stating:
…treating the terrorism suspect seized in the United States as a criminal suspect pursuant to statutes that proscribe engagement in terrorist activity focuses the narrative on the alleged terrorist activity, rather than his status as a ‘warrior,’ thereby deconstructing the terrorist narrative. The heroism of armed conflict against the enemy becomes the cowardice of anonymous violence against innocent victims. The aspiring member of a great army, when isolated to his crime, becomes a small-minded individual.
About a warrior held in a military prison an extravagant mythology may be erected; but the fellow in the dock of a public trial, forced to witness the deliberate presentation of evidence of his cowardice becomes pathetic. His narrative loses the power to inspire. Like Ramzi Yousef, Fawaz Yunis, and many others convicted of terrorist acts in U.S. courts, he may soon be forgotten.[4]
Surprisingly, the authors ignore the case of Sheik Omar Abdul al-Rahman. Sheikh al-Rahman had a leading role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and was eventually indicted and convicted for seditious acts against the U.S. He is currently serving a life sentence in a maximum security penitentiary in the U.S., but has not been forgotten by our enemies and is frequently cited in recruitment efforts by al Qaeda.
For example, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri concluded an interview conducted four years after 9-11 by making no distinction between terrorists convicted in U.S. courts and detainees held in Guantanamo and elsewhere: “In closing, I take this opportunity to address our captives, who are being held in Crusader jails, and especially our mujahid Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman, as well as our captives in America, in Guantanamo, in Abu Ghraib, in Baghram, in the secret American jails around the world, and in the prisons of the tyrants of Egypt, the Peninsula, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and in Palestine and elsewhere – I say to them: We have not forgotten you. We are still committed to the debt of your salvation. And with Allah’s strength, we will continue to deliver blows to America and its allies, until we shatter your shackles.”[5]
Moreover, Osama Bin Laden made no such distinction in a speech on “tactical recommendations” in which he made clear he has not forgotten Sheikh Omar Abdul al-Rahman: “We ask God to free us from the Americans and their allies, and to free Sheikhs Omar Abdel Rahman and Said Ibn Zuwayr, as well as our brothers in Guantanamo.”[6] In a Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, Bin Laden said: “…the Judeo-Christian coalition assassinated or jailed the most sincere ulema and the most active preachers…; they killed Abdallah Azzam, the sheikh and mujahid, and jailed Ahmad Yassin, the sheikh and mujahid, on the path of the Prophet’s ‘nocturnal voyage’. They jailed Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman in America….”[7]
In May 1998, two years after Sheikh al-Rahman was convicted and sentenced to life in a U.S. prison, the sheikh’s two sons were present at a press conference where, as recounted by Rohan Gunaratna in Inside Al Qaeda, “Osama [Bin Laden] called once again for jihad against US troops and announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders.”[8] Gunarantna notes that al-Zawahiri and Muhammed Atef, the one-time head of military operations for Al Qaeda until he was killed in November 2001, were also present at the press conference.[9] During the conference, the sheikh’s two sons distributed a card with a picture of the blind sheikh praying and a message calling for Muslims to attack Jews and Christians: “Divide their nation, tear them to shreds, destroy their economy, burn their companies, ruin their welfare, sink their ships and kill them on land, sea and air.”[10]
It is clear that al Qaeda has not forgotten the case of Sheikh al-Rahman. Moreover, it appears that the blind sheikh has not lost his ability to inflame the passions of potential jihadists. This is not to say that trial in U.S. courts is a bad idea. But to imply that it is more effective in countering terrorist recruitment efforts than indefinite detention in Guantanamo is to ignore a blatant example suggesting that al Qaeda makes no distinction between Guantanamo detainees and terrorists convicted in U.S. courts.
[1] Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, Petitioner, v. Daniel Spagone, U.S.N. Commander, Consolidated Naval Brig, Respondent, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Brief Amici Curiae of Former National Security Officials and Counterterorism Experts in Support of Petitioner (“Amicus brief”), p. 11.
[2] Amicus brief, p. 22
[3] Amicus brief, p. 18
[4] Amicus brief, pp. 20-21
[5] Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader, Broadway Books, 2007, pp. 188-89.
[6] Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 65.
[7] Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 48.
[8] Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, Berkeley Publishing Group, 2002, 2003, p. 63.
[9] Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, Berkeley Publishing Group, 2002, 2003, p. 63.
[10] Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, Berkeley Publishing Group, 2002, 2003, p. 63.
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