Somalia and Piracy

Note: the following is a work in progress

Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed has had a storied role in the history of Somalia. In December 2008, he resigned as President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, four years after he stepped down as President of his native Puntland in northeastern Somalia to become TFG President.[1] In the 1980s, he headed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which was based in Ethiopia and sought to overthrow the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre.[2] After Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991, and Somalia’s descent into civil war, he continued to be a leading figure in the SSDF while consolidating his power base in Puntland.[3] It was during this time that he also became Somalia’s first pirate.

Not literally, of course. But Dr. J. Peter Pham notes that, in 1997, a Somali militia linked to Yusuf received a ransom of approximately $1 million after seizing a Taiwanese fishing trawler.[4] According to Dr. Pham, Yusuf thus became “the first pirate chieftain to get a $1 million payoff from the hijacking of [a] vessel.”[5] Moreover, Yusuf’s tenure as president of Puntland, which began in 1998, saw a dramatic increase in people-trafficking, counterfeiting, arms smuggling, and piracy.[6] Yusuf himself made connections with several businessmen involved in piracy, including current Puntland President Abdul Rahman Farole.[7] A decade later, Dr. Pham notes that his “fellow Majeerteen Darod sub-clansmen have a disproportionately high representation in the ranks of the pirates.”[8]

None of this is to suggest that Yusuf is the key to uprooting piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Rather, it is to illustrate that piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia involves a network of well-connected and high-placed power brokers in Somali society, including criminal organizations, clan militias, and even jihadist elements that exploit the fragile, if not anarchic, state of affairs in the country. Yusuf’s pirate raid a decade ago exemplifies that existing power brokers in Somalia have nurtured, and continue to nurture, the ongoing problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. This is especially so in the northeast Puntland, where piracy can be traced at least as far back as the 1990s, when Majerteen clansmen under the leadership of Abdullahi Boqor Muse made a business of “taxing” foreign fishing ships via pirate ransoms.[9]

In April, the saga of the Maersk Alabama brought U.S. and international attention to the rising tide of piracy in the horn of Africa. The International Maritime Bureau has recorded at least 84 attacks in the first quarter of 2009 and 111 attacks in the region in 2008, approximately twice the number of recorded attacks in 2007.[10] One source puts the typical ransoms paid at $3 million to $5 million on demands that range from $100 million to $150 million.[11]

Headlines in the press often parlay the story of Somali piracy as “economic opportunism” by uprooted Somali fishermen-vigilantes striking back at international sea vessels guilty of over-fishing and dumping waste into waters. According to one account, the collapse of the Somali government in 1991 has brought 9 million Somalis to the brink of starvation, a situation that “many of the ugliest forces in the Western world have seen…as a great opportunity to steal the country's food supply and dump [its] nuclear waste in their seas.”[12]

But this analysis is too simplistic. It is true enough that the well-stocked seas have attracted unscrupulous poachers, and waste-dumping has been a problem in the ungoverned waters. However, piracy would not be possible without opportunistic forces in Somalia that arm, train, motivate, and dispatch gangs of pirates into the open seas, sometimes hundreds of miles off the coast.

The problems of over-fishing and waste dumping, while important problems in their own right, seem little more than convenient justifications for rogue opportunism, i.e. piracy. Fishing is not a significant part of the Somali economy.[13] Most Somalis apparently do not eat fish, so the fishing stock is mainly exported. There are approximately 30,000 full-time Somali fishermen in a population estimated at 10 million people.[14] Meanwhile, according to the East African Seafarers' Association, there are at least five pirate gangs making up a total of approximately 1,000 men between the ages of 20 and 35.[15] Thus, even if many Somalis profess support for pirates, most do not take up piracy themselves. Why?

In short, one does not simply wake up one morning and become a pirate. Aside from the obvious risk-reward calculations, one chooses to become a pirate if he has the skills and connections. This means prospective pirates must arm and train. They must also navigate the seas as well as the existing landscape of power brokers who inevitably want a cut of the ransoms in exchange for the right to dock at harbors and to operate underground exchanges of arms and money without disruption by ruling authorities. Speaking generally about pirate operations, Daniel Sekulich writes in his book Terror on the Seas:

You must overcome whatever moral qualms you might have about a life of crime, recruit individuals willing to aid and abet in attacking mariners, acquire vessels to carry out these attacks, develop a base from which to operate those vessels, outfit the craft with suitable weaponry and sundry supplies, foster sources of intelligence from within the shipping community, and find the ways to dispose of whatever booty is obtained, to say nothing of risking your life and freedom.[16]

In other words, piracy is a business. It reflects a risk-reward calculus, a disciplined effort, and good connections. Haphazard operations devised by inexperienced operators usually do not pan out well, as shown here.[17] But well-organized operations with sufficient funds, arms, and skilled participants provide a good investment opportunity for the high-placed individuals and groups behind the scenes who fund, arm, and mobilize the bands of “poor” pirates ferreting out to sea in search of booty. According to Peter Lehr:

Their modus operandi is telling, too. The pirates have reached a technical and nautical sophistication matching that of many “real” coastguards all over the world: Somali pirates operate from mother ships, probably small freighters or local dhows, which enable them to strike so far out at sea. They use satellite phones and GPS as navigational aids, and once they spot their prey they attack it in wolfpack-style, swarming the targeted vessel with fast fiberglass boats and halting its passage by firing AK-47 salvoes or even rocket-propelled grenade rounds. Then they board the vessel, and the maritime hostage scenario begins.[18]

Somalia analyst Mohamed Mohamed says Somali pirate gangs are usually made up of (1) ex-fishermen, with the nautical skills to navigate the sea, (2) ex-militiamen, who have fought for various Somali clan warlords, and (3) technical experts, who operate the hi-tech equipment such as satellite phones, GPS and military hardware.[19] The weapons come from Yemen and Mogadishu, with dealers getting a deposit from the pirates through a hawala dealer before shipping the arms to Puntland where the remaining balance is paid and pirates receive their weapons.[20]

Thus, piracy in Somalia is facilitated by network of power brokers who control the political and economic levers that make it possible. That means clan militias, criminal organizations, and yes, jihadist groups. Jihadist networks may not be intimately involved in piracy, but reports have surfaced that al Shabaab has attempted to share in the proceeds, and pirates have shuttled foreign fighters and arms from Yemen to Somalia. The pirates who dock in south and central Somalia must be on reasonable terms with Islamic insurgents who largely control this area.

During the hijacking of Saudi ship Sirius Star last fall, fighters from the Shabaab militia reportedly turned up in the port of Haradheere in southern Somalia, close to where the ship was anchored.[21] The insurgents expressed disapproval of a pirate attack on a Muslim ship, but were undoubtedly interested in a share of ransom money.[22] The Shabaab fighters used to be the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union, which briefly ruled Somalia a couple of years ago and attempted to eradicate piracy. But now engaged in a guerrilla war against the TFG, al Shabaab can be expected to seek a share of pirate ransoms to finance its military campaign.

None of this should come as a surprise. Though ideology drives the movement, Islamic terrorist groups have been almost cynical, and certainly creative, in their opportunism. Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups, which include al Shabaab, have shown imagination and stealth in finding sources of funding, and often stop at no bounds in their willingness to associate with groups that have diverse aims and interests. Thus, the Taliban and al Qaeda are entrenched in the heroin trade, probably involved in conflict diamonds, and engaged in strategic operations with Iran. Al Qaeda and the Taliban are the quintessential Machiavels - the end seems to justify all means.

Al Qaeda could eventually view piracy as yet another form of jihad against infidel ships passing through the seas, and the problems of over-fishing and waste dumping offer convenient sources of propaganda to mobilize prospective martyrs. It’s also conceivable that pirates could benefit from involvement with elements of the jihadist network.

Somalia is, if anything, a clan-based society with identity linked to lineage. Al Qaeda has penetrated these clan and lineage-based networks in the past. Piracy could perhaps be facilitated by the same networks and power brokers that fought in the early 1990s to eradicate international peacekeepers from the country.

[1] http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/somalia/country_conditions/Prunier.pdf
[2] http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/somalia/country_conditions/Prunier.pdf; http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/sierra/somalia1978b.htm
[3] Source
[4] http://worlddefensereview.com/pham021909.shtml ; http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11785712&Itemid=0; http://www.bartamaha.com/?p=4007
[5] http://worlddefensereview.com/pham021909.shtml
[6] http://www.bartamaha.com/?p=4007
[7] http://www.bartamaha.com/?p=4007
[8] http://worlddefensereview.com/pham021909.shtml
[9] http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/somalia/country_conditions/Prunier.pdf
[10] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30501853/
[11] http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2009/08/10/Commentary-Al-Qaidas-navy/UPI-37721249909200/
[12] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/you-are-being-lied-to-abo_b_155147.html
[13] http://www.photius.com/countries/somalia/society/somalia_society_population_and_settl~1595.html
[14] Source
[15] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/18/somalia-oil
[16] Daniel Sekulich, Terror on the Seas, St. Martin’s Press, 2009, pp. 80-81.
[17] http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0531/p06s03-woaf.html
[18] http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/nov/19/piracy-somalia
[19] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7650415.stm
[20] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piracy_in_Somalia
[21] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/3501024/Islamic-fighters-enter-Somalia-pirate-town-and-plan-to-attack.html
[22] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/3501024/Islamic-fighters-enter-Somalia-pirate-town-and-plan-to-attack.html